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1. Introduction 
amaica struggled through several attempts at a unified monetary 
regime prior to the law establishing the Commissioners of Currency in 
1904. In the country’s early colonial history, Jamaicans used Spanish 
and Portuguese coins due to the absence of an established Jamaican 
currency. The Spanish and Portuguese coins, especially the Spanish silver 
real (also called the piece of eight or dollar) were widely used in the 
Caribbean and across the world. This period had a fixed exchange rate for 
the coins, although it resulted in the Jamaican government lacking full 
authority over monetary policy. It can be seen as an early example of what 
is now referred to as dollarization, when a country enacts the complete use 
of another economy’s currency as its own (Hanke, 2002). This led to 
problems in Jamaica with shortages of coins in circulation, in part because 
of attempts to set exchange rates among coins at legal rates different from 
market rates. (For more information on the pre-currency board currencies 
of Jamaica, see Chalmers, 1893: 97-113.) 
Due to the lack of coins in circulation and large amounts of outstanding 
debt, Jamaica began to seek alternative payment methods. In the 
earlytomid 1800s, the Jamaican government began to issue “island checks.” 
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These island checks were essentially IOUs to pay off government debts 
with an issuance of deferredliabilities (Callender, 1965: 2-5). The problem 
arose that the government did not back these deferred liabilities with any 
form of reserves and in many cases did not pay their holders with gold or 
silver when demanded. The exact date at which these defaults were 
occurring was not listed in the sources we consulted – although Callender 
remarked that it was leading up to the Jamaican Act of 1839 (see below). 
This caused a panic for all island check-holders when the government 
officially neglected payment due to lack of funds on hand. At this point, the 
Jamaican government experienced an event similar to a bankrun and 
effectively went bankrupt. The islandTreasurer eventually decided that the 
government would pay off all outstanding liabilities that it could with the 
coins it had on hand, and the remaining island checks rest would be 
converted into debt in the form of long-term callable bonds. These debt-
issuances were given no specific maturity, but the government promised 
they would be paid off. To make matters worse, there was financial distress 
and recession in both the United States and United Kingdom in 1837 
(Roose, 1948). These events led the Jamaican government to reform the 
currency. In the midst of the financial chaos in 1838, Jamaica emancipated 
slaves, causing an increase in demand for small-denomination currency 
notes and coins. This ultimately led to the decision by the Jamaican 
government in 1839 that as of 31 December 1840, only British coinage 
would be legal tender on the island (Jamaica Act of 1839). This law 
demonetized all Spanish and Portuguese currencies except for the Spanish 
gold doubloon, which had a fixed exchange rate at that time of £3. Jamaica 
henceforth used British coins until establishing a central bank and had no 
local coinage except for coins of one penny (1/240th of a pound) and below 
issued starting in 1869.  
At this point, to counteract the loss of notes in circulation for the 
economy, the Jamaican government began allowing the emerging 
commercial banks to issue their own notes (i.e.,“freebanking”). The main 
authority in commercial banking was the locally owned Bank of Jamaica, 
which had no connection to the central bank established in 1961. The Bank 
of Jamaica was allowed to issue notes backed by island checks, gold, or 
silver, but denominations had to be no smaller than £1. This was significant 
because £1 was more than an average Jamaican worker would receive in 
wages in more than one month’s work (Callender, 1965: 4-9). The Bank of 
Jamaica continued to issue these notes until it was acquired by the London-
based Colonial Bank in 1865, at which point the Colonial Bank essentially 
gained monopoly power. The Colonial Bank reigned supreme over Jamaica 
until Canadian banks began to open branches in Jamaica in the late 1800’s. 
This period of “freebanking” appears to have been one of monetary 
stability, as was the case with many free banking systems elsewhere, 
although not enough research on it exists to reach definitive conclusions. 
Bank-issued notes were denominated in pounds, equivalent to pounds 
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sterling, whereas in most other British West Indian colonies commerce was 
conducted in West Indies dollars (West Indies $4.80 = £1 sterling). 
The Jamaican currency remained strong due to a fixed exchange rate to 
the pound sterling amidst a system where multiple currency brands were 
accepted. In the early 1900’s the Jamaican government, led by the island 
Treasurer, began to consider the possibility of establishing a currency 
board. The Jamaican government decided that it was time to call for 
Jamaican government currency to become the main currency on the island. 
There were no motives mentioned in the works we consulted for why the 
Jamaican government wanted a currency board. It shall be noted however, 
that in British Honduras in 1894, a currency board had been established. 
This could have led the Jamaican government to the idea of creating itsown 
currency board. Government officials may have reasoned that the strong 
backing that a currency board offered would enable government currency 
to supplant notes issued by the commercial banks. This did not end the 
freebanking period right away, but eventually is created a dominant 
government-issued Jamaican note issue.  
 
2. History of the Jamaican currency board 
The Jamaica Commissioners of Currency existed from 15 March 1920 to 
30 April 1961, when the organization was succeeded by the Bank of 
Jamaica, the central bank that continues in existence today. The currency 
board used the pounds-shilling-pence system identical to that of the United 
Kingdom, with Jamaican £1 = £1 sterling = 20 shillings (s.) = 240 pence (d.) 
(Bank of Jamaica, 2010). The currency board was intended to prevent 
depreciation of the Jamaican currency. However, as with any currency 
board, monetary policy was in effect transferred to the anchor currency, the 
pound sterling, which became an issue when Jamaica began to consider 
complete independence in the mid 1900’s. This led to the demise of the 
currency board for Jamaica, a step whose wisdom has since been 
questioned.   
The earliest written documentation calling for the necessity of a currency 
board in Jamaica dates back to 1904. On 22 September 1904, Jamaica 
published the Currency Notes Law, establishing a currency board to issue 
10-shilling notes (Laws of Jamaica, Currency Notes Law, No. 27 of 1904). 
Although the board was not actually initiated for several years, the law 
created a three-man Commissioners of Currency. No documentation has 
been found for this paper on who were to be the commissioners, how they 
were chosen, and how long they would be active on the board. The three 
commissioners were allowed to issue and redeem notes in a combination of 
both gold and silver coin. The initial regulation called for a full reserve 
(100% percent) against the notes, of which two-thirds would be held in 
(gold or silver) coin and the rest in securities of the British Empire other 
than Jamaica. This reserve was referred to as the Note Security Fund. The 
Governor of Jamaica, with the approval of the British Colonial Office, could 
change the reserve of the Note Security Fund from the two-thirds coin and 
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one-third securities to an even split of one-half of each (Bank of Jamaica, 
2010). This change could happen by decree and needed no new law. The 
law also called for the government to accumulate a new reserve equal to at 
least 10 percentof assets, accumulated from interest on securities held. This 
was referred to as the Depreciation Fund because that even if some 
securities lost value, foreign reserves would still be at least 100 percent with 
the additional 10 percentasset buffer. The Depreciation Fund made it 
extremely unlikely that the currency board would ever lack full backing 
against the value of its notes.  
The Commissioners of Currency remained inactive for a number of 
years. On 19 September 1918the Currency Notes Amendment Law 
provided that notes of any denomination could be issued, as well as 
reducing the minimum coin reserve from two-thirds to one-half (Laws of 
Jamaica, Currency Notes Law No.17). This marked the true beginning of 
the currency board, and the Commissioners of Currency began to draw 
plans to print shilling notes. During the beginning of the issuance of 
securities, the Commissioners started hinting at the idea of dropping a 
significant coin reserve which paid no interest, to holding more securities 
that paid interest. This would yield the Commissioners of Currency greater 
return, albeit with some increase in risk.   
On 9 January 1920, the Currency Amendment Law was passed (Laws of 
Jamaica, Currency Notes Law No.2). This allowed the Commissioners of 
Currency to accept and pay out British Treasury £1 and 10-shilling notes for 
the first time as if they were British coins. These notes, nicknamed 
“Bradburys” after the British Treasury official who signed them, were first 
issued in 1914 as a World War I emergency measure to provide lower-
denomination paper currency than could be offered by the Bank of 
England, which was not allowed to issue notes under £5. The 
Commissioners of Currency officially issued their first notes under the 
aforementioned second amendment to the Currency Notes Law on 15 
March 1920. Each of the three denominations bore a portrait of King 
George V, the ruling monarch of the United Kingdom from 1910 until his 
death in 1936. The notes also included a signature from C.C. Anderson, 
who was the Treasurer of Jamaica during the issuance of the notes and 
presumably one of the Commissioner of Currency. 
The Colonial Bank, which held a de facto monopoly of commercial 
banking between 1865 and 1889 (Callender, 1965: 2-3), was issuing £1 and 
£5 notes. It was this, as well as a scarcity of silver around the world at the 
time, that caused the Commissioners of Currency to choose to issue smaller 
denominations: 2/6 (2 shillings 6 pence, equal to £0.125), 5 shillings (equal 
to £0.25), and 10 shillings (equal to £0.50). The 5- and 10-shilling notes were 
issued throughout the currency board period. Undocumented stories exist 
that the 2/6notes were only supposed to be issued for a few years, but no 
official documentation of such a plan can be found. The denomination was 
withdrawn from circulation in 1922, just two years after it was issued. 
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The Commissioners continued with only the 5- and 10-shilling notes 
from 1922 into the late 1930s. The Currency Notes Law of 1937 gave that 
the Board of Commissioners power to issue £1 and £5 notes. The issuance 
of the larger denominations officially began in 1940, by which time the 
British Empire had entered World War II and demand for currency was 
rising strongly. The reserves and the redemption procedures of the 
currency board were revised to conform to those of other British colonial 
currency boards of the time (Currency Notes Law, Nos. 9 and 27 of 1937). 
Previously, notes had been redeemable in coins, which made sense because 
the denominations issued were mainly used as coin substitutes. However, 
once the board was allowed to issue notes of a larger denomination the 
Commissioners decided to change the medium of redemption from coins to 
sterling drafts on London. This law also made a commission fee legal. The 
board could charge a fee for commission on transactions while also being 
allowed to set minimum transaction sizes. The board initially established a 
1.75 percent transaction fee on all transactions, which had to be at least 
J£5,000.The board could at this point issue both coins and notes, and the 
government Treasury officially stopped issuing coin in the 1940’s, which 
meant the board was responsible for all government issued currency for 
Jamaica. 
From 1939 until the end of the currency board period, the Jamaican 
pound remained fully convertible into the pound sterling but was not fully 
convertible into many third currencies. Restrictions on convertibility began 
during World War II to prevent trading with the enemy and continued 
afterwards to prop up the value of sterling (Hanke & Schuler 1995). Many 
countries within the British Commonwealth agreed to full convertibility 
within the sterling area but were restricted convertibility outside the area, 
notably with the U.S. dollar, to attempt to support the value of sterling.  
The currency board became the leading issuer of currency for the first 
time at the end of 1941, when the total value of its notes in circulation 
exceeded the value of commercial bank notes for the first time. It marked 
the transition from a free banking monetary system into a nation run on a 
currency board.   
In 1954, a new Currency Notes Law established that no commercial 
banks other than the successor to the Colonial Bank — Barclays Bank 
(Dominion, Colonial and Overseas) — could issue new notes (Currency 
Notes Law, No.9 of 1954). This prohibited two major commercial banks, the 
Royal Bank of Canada and Bank of Nova Scotia, from issuing notes, which 
redistributed significant market share to the Commissioners of Currency. 
The law also included the Exchange Control Act of 1954 which imposed 
strict regulations on trading in currencies outside the sterling area 
(Currency Notes Law, No.50 of 1954). The intent was to support sterling, 
and due to the currency board’s link to sterling, the Jamaican pound. In 
September 1954, the favorable economic conditions due to high earnings 
from the post-Korean boom allowed for expansion in both public and 
private investment. These were stated as the reason for the increase in 
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currency issues. There was belief that the expansion of the colonial 
economies would need more currency circulation and reserves. 
Due to the post-World War II weakness of the pound sterling, the 
reserve laws were soon reconsidered. Up to that point, as mentioned above, 
the board had to hold 100 percent reserves in foreign assets with a 10 
percentadditional buffer to protect against depreciation of the securities the 
board held. (See the Jamaica Gazette tab in the accompanying Excel 
workbook.) However, the Commissioners believed that the foreign reserve 
ratio was unnecessarily high (Hanke & Schuler 1995: 21). The Currency 
Notes Law of 1956 allowed the board to hold Jamaican government 
securities worth up to J£1 million, which was nearly one-fifth of total notes 
and coin in circulation (Currency Notes Law of 1956, Law 1). The 
government made further amendments to the foreign reserve ratios in 1958, 
raising the limit on domestic securities to J£3 million (Currency Notes Law 
of 1958, Law 1). This raised the total domestic securities the board could 
hold to about 35 percent of note and coin in circulation. At this point, the 
board’s foreign reserve ratio fell to 65 percent of total notes and coin in 
circulation, deviating from currency board orthodoxy (Callender, 1965: 93-
4).  
Previously, the currency board had held a modest amount of domestic 
assets, apparently to be able to pay local expenses. The acquisition of 
substantial domestic assets was an early stage in the transition from the 
currency board to a central bank. The move away from currency board 
orthodoxy was intentional. Total liabilities outweighed total foreign assets 
for the first time in 1959 (see Figure 1 below). Before this, as seen in the 
coinciding data provided with the paper, it is evident that the total foreign 
assets usually accounted for 100-110 percent of total liabilities. The 
difference can be considered a “networth” plug” in the accounting, 
something common in British Caribbean colonies (Krus & Schuler, 2014).   
There was another important change in 1958. The Currency Notes Law 
of 1958 (mentioned above) stopped Barclays Bank from issuing notes. This 
officially left the board the sole issuer of local currency in Jamaica. In the 
absence of entities issuing competing currencies on the island, the 
Commissioners of Currency began to act similar to a central bank for the 
first time. With a monopoly over the issuance of notes and coin in 
circulation, the Commissioners held all monetary control possible at that 
time, albeit scarce. The currency board had no potential powers of 
monetary management other than to vary its holdings of Jamaican 
government securities within the legal limits, but it always held the 
maximum allowed, so it did not exercise that potential power (Hanke & 
Schuler, 2017).  
In the 1950s, the American economist John Exter and the Austrian-
British economist John Mars critiqued the colonial currency board in their 
works Report on the Establishment of a Central Bank for Ceylon and The 
Monetary and Banking System and Loan Market of Nigeria.  They claimed that 
the automatic exchange for Jamaican pounds for sterling would mean that 
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there is an intrinsic relationship between changes in money supply and 
balance of payments. A surplus in the balance of payments would mean 
that the sterling would be deposited with the currency board in exchange 
for local currency. This would increase the stock of currency and generate 
price increases. If there was a deficit in the balance of payments, people 
would give up local currency and the stock of currency would be spent on 
the same number of goods, so prices would decrease. 
However, this was not completely accurate, because the policy of 
commercial banks also plays a role in the change in money supply. If a 
surplus in the balance of paymentsis deposited in the banks, they can hold 
onto it, use it to increase loans and advances domestically, or invest in 
short-term assets abroad. The first option would not allow for any increase 
in income and the second and third would lead to an increase in the money 
supply. 
Another criticism of the currency board system was that it requires a 100 
percentforeign reserve backing. Holding domestic assets instead of foreign 
assets is not just a pure benefit, though. Domestic assets are less liquid and 
riskier than the foreign assets that currency boards typically hold, so the 
higher return that they may offer comes at a price. The price is the much 
higher frequency of devaluations under central banks than under currency 
boards. 
 
3. The Jamaican economy during the currency board 
period 
During the currency board era, the Jamaican pound was fully 
convertible to the pound sterling. From 1953 until 1960, real GDP per capita 
grew by nearly 7 percent. However, in the central banking, real GDP per 
capita fell in the 1970s and grew by a rate of roughly 2 percent for the 
remainder of the period. This can also be attributed to a sharp increase in 
the Jamaican population. 
Over the same period from 1950 through 1961, gross capital formation 
had a strong growth from 1950 until 1957, but slowed down from 1958 
through 1961. The increase in capital formation caused savings 
mobilization and the transfer of savings to investors in capital goods. The 
old financial institutions mobilized savings and transferred them to various 
parts of the economy, but new institutions were required to meet the needs 
of a changing economy. It was this change that spurred a slowing gross 
capital formation in Jamaica at the end of the period being analyzed 
(Callender, 1965: 75). 
The tourist industry developed into a large portion of the Jamaican 
economy during the currency board period. In 1950, the total number of 
tourists was almost 75,000 and 1961 it exceeded 224,000. Tourism was even 
more important as a source of earnings in dollars(unlike the pound sterling, 
a fully convertible currency) than as a share of GDP. 
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4. Analysis of orthodoxy of Jamaican currency board 
Tests on the currency board for Jamaica were done primarily by use of 
the Jamaica Gazettes and colonial annual reports. First, Krus & Schuler 
(2014) provided annual balance sheet data from Jamaica for 1921-1959 from 
the annual reports of the Commissioners of Currency and the colonial 
annual reports. They found annual data except for 1930 and 1940 (no data 
at all), and 1941-44 (note circulation data only). Due to the missing years, 
certain periods are left out of the tests and graphs below. For each of the 
figures below, there is no data input for 1930 and 1940-1944. These dates 
are disregarded. Years are labeled on every graph so this will be evident 
simply by looking at them.  
The first test we did was the main orthodoxy test for a currency board. A 
currency board is supposed to back all notes in circulation with foreign 
assets to a specific reserve ratio. In the case of the Jamaican currency board 
— as mentioned earlier in the paper — the board was managed in a very 
specific way. Up until the later years around 1956, the board was supposed 
to hold a full reserve of 100 percent of foreign assets, and in most cases, an 
additional buffer around 10 percent. This would cause the total value of the 
assets in reserve to never fall below the face value of the notes outstanding. 
This would signify an extremely orthodox currency board. After 1956, 
anticipating the dissolution of the currency board, the commissioners were 
allowed to transfer some of the foreign assets into domestic assets. This 
lead to the first deviation from orthodoxy around 1959 (as apparent in 
Figure 1). This shows that starting at the inception, the Jamaican currency 
board never deviated from orthodoxy and the 10 percent interest buffer 
was not only smart but critical as the value did depreciate in some years. 
The only period that the board was unorthodox fell in the period where 
they began planning to remove the currency board. This shows a perfectly 
orthodox currency board run by the Commissioners of Currency in 
Jamaica; slightly uncharacteristic of the similar Commonwealth colonies in 
the Caribbean. 
The second test provided below determines the percentages of assets 
held in each asset class. The original legislation drafted for the 
commissioners of currency called for a specific breakdown of assets held in 
securities versus alternative means (i.e. Coin [silver]).  As mentioned above, 
the initial regulation called for a full reserve (100 percent) where two-thirds 
would be held in coin and the rest in securities of the British Empire, 
outside of Jamaica. This reserve was referred to as the Note Security Fund. 
It was the Governor of Jamaica, with the approval of the British Colonial 
Office, that changed the reserve of the Note Security Fund from the two-
thirds coin and one-third securities to an even split of one-half of each 
(Bank of Jamaica, 2010). Test 2, determines the exact breakdown, by year, of 
the asset classes as percentages of total assets. Determining from Test 1 that 
the currency board was orthodox by means of reserve ratios, it will now be 
determined the level of orthodoxy by asset classes held. The coinciding 
graph labeled Figure 2 shows exact values compiled from data from Dr. 
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Kurt Schuler and Nick Krus in the Colonial Annual Reports, and checked 
by the Jamaican Gazettes in our digitization tabs.  
The next test performed is a reserve pass-through test. This test shows 
the extent to which the change in net foreign assets are reflected in the 
change to the monetary base. Furthermore, a reserve pass-through equal to 
100 percent states that when net foreign assets rise 100 million, the 
Jamaican Commissioners of Currency Note’s monetary base should also 
rise by 100 million. There should exists a margin of error, however, so 
deviations of 20 percent, above or below, are considered orthodox. To 
calculate the reserve pass-through, the change in the monetary base is 
divided by the change in net foreign assets. The absolute value of that 
outcome will yield the reserve pass-through. This test will be the hardest to 
view on the graph, but does back up the claims for the two previous tests. 
This test is important because it shows how the change in net foreign assets 
are influencing the monetary base. In a perfectly orthodox currency board, 
it would translate that each addition ‘x’ into the net foreign assets would 
result in an addition ‘x’ into the monetary base.  
The final test performed involving looking at domestic assets. In order 
for a currency board to be orthodox, domestic assets should be at or around 
zeropercent of total assets. Many currency boards hold small amounts of 
domestic assets to pay salaries or expenses. In fact, from nearly the 
beginning of their existence, the Commissioners of Currency held some 
amounts of deposits with the Government Savings Bank or the Jamaican 
Treasury in order to pay these types of expenses. These deposits were not a 
large deviation from orthodoxy because the currency board did not seem to 
intend to maintain large, permanent domestic assets on the balance sheet. 
However, starting in 1959, the Commissioners began to invest in Jamaican 
government securities. These changes showed a departure from orthodoxy 
since they were intended to be permanent holdings of domestic assets. 
 
4.1. Test 1: Orthodoxy of the Jamaican currency board 
The first test is checking the orthodoxy of the currency board of Jamaica 
in the period of 1921-1959. All years were accounted for with proper data 
except 1930 and 1940-1944. The data used was from the annual balance 
sheet data provided by Krus & Schuler (2014), as well as the data from the 
Jamaica Gazette.    
The first test was determining whether the face value of all the notes 
outstanding each year were accounted for (in the 100-110 percent range) in 
the assets held by the Commissioners of currency. This was done in the 
excel supplement to the paper. The first two years, 1921-2922, were 
different than the others so they will be described first. For the first two 
years the calculations for assets accounted for the following: Coin [coins 
and British Currency Notes] and Note Guarantee [Security] Fund 
Investments. The sum of the two aforementioned sections was divided by 
the total notes in circulation by the currency board to determine if the 
reserve ratio was above 100 percent of the notes in circulation. It was, of 
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course, above the requirement. For the years following (1923-1959) the 
following categories of assets were used in calculations: Coin [Silver coin], 
British Currency Notes, Note Guarantee [Security] Fund Investments, Joint 
Colonial Fund, and Treasurer [for investment or on deposit]. The sum of 
those sections were divided by the total notes in circulation for each year to 
determine the orthodoxy. The following data illustrates the results from 
Test 1: Orthodoxy of the Jamaican Currency Board:    
Deviations from Orthodoxy:  
1923 - Foreign Assets / Currency Notes Outstanding = 99.94 percent 
This was the only ratio less than 100 percent and it was only 0.06 percent 
off of the mark. The reason that this year may have deviated from the year 
before was due to a 45.77 percent decrease in Coin [Silver coin] + British 
Currency Notes from the previous year. The reason for this is unknown 
after extensive research, however, in 1924 the Coin [Silver coin] + British 
Currency Notes increased by 9.54 percent as well as an increase from J£0 to 
J£6,798.13 in Treasurer [for investment or on deposit]. This change in 1924 
yielded a 35.62 percent increase in foreign assets held which rebounded the 
reserve ratio from 99.94 percent to 100 percent. After 1923 there was not 
another value below 100 percent until 1959.  
1959 - Foreign Assets / Currency Notes Outstanding = 84.8 percent 
As mentioned above, this case was done by shifting some foreign assets 
into domestic assets which diluted the Foreign Assets / Currency Notes 
Outstanding. 1959 was the first year on the annual balance sheet where 
both Jamaican Government Securities and Jamaica Treasury Bills were 
accounted for. If the reserve ratio was changed to Foreign &Domestic 
Assets / Currency Notes Outstanding, accounting for the Jamaican 
Government Securities and Jamaica Treasury Bills, it would be 105.75 
percent, which still would fall above the orthodoxy ratio.  
Therefore, from the data provided above, as well as the graph below 
derived from the supplementary excel worksheet, we can see that the only 
true deviation from orthodoxy occurred in 1923. It should be notes that this 
was the first year that Coin [Silver coin] and British Currency Notes were 
listed separately. This could have caused a slight difference in the 
accounting. Even without an error, it was only 0.06 percent less than 
orthodox which can be seen as an extremely insignificant difference. Hence, 
Test 1: Orthodoxy of the Jamaican Currency Board proves that the Jamaican 
Currency Board was run almost flawlessly in terms of reserve ratios 
remaining in the required range.  
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Figure 1. Test 1: Orthodoxy of Jamaican Currency Board 
Source: Jamaican Gazette, Colonial Annual Reports, Calculations 
 
4.2. Test 2: Reserve Ratio by Asset Type (aspercent of total assets) 
The second test is checking the orthodoxy of the currency board of 
Jamaica in the period of 1921-1959 specifically by seeing the asset classes (as 
a percentage of total assets). All years were accounted for with proper data 
except 1930, 1941-1944, and those years were interpolated from previous 
year’s data. The data used was from the compiled annual balance sheet 
data provided by Krus and Schuler, as well as data from the Jamaica Gazette. 
The reason the test is important was because the original legislation calls 
for specific ratios of asset classes to be held in reserves. It is evident, based 
on results in Test 1, that the currency board was orthodox in terms of the 
required reserve ratios. However, Test 2 seems to show unorthodoxy in the 
percentage of each asset classes held, deviating from what the 
Commissioners originally called for. The initial law created called for only 
one-third of total assets in reserve to be securities, though after revision it 
was changed to one-half. Based on Figure 2 and Figure 3 above, 1921-1936 
followed suit relatively well and was orthodox given a small margin of 
error. However, it is evident that after 1936 the percent of securities held 
out of total assets would significantly outweigh the other assets held. 
Figure 3 broke down the years into roughly 10-year averages to collectively 
show the transition away from the original law the commissioners called 
for. From 1938-1959 the percent of assets held in securities increased to a 
range of 70-90 percent and did not leave that range more than once.  
The possible implications linked with how the Commissioners were 
supposed to break the assets down as percentages of total assets, and how 
they actually did, could come from a few things. First, as mentioned above, 
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within the amendment to the initial reserve law, it called for the 
government to accumulate a new reserve that would have at least 10 
percent interest from securities held. This was referred to as “The 
Depreciation Fund” because it claimed that even if some securities lost 
value, the offsetting balance of the foreign currencies reserve would still be 
at least 100 percent with the additional 10 percent interest buffer (Laws of 
Jamaica, Currency Notes Law). Due to this buffer - it is possible that the 
Commissioners realized they could hold more securities increasing the 
Depreciation Fund, but also increasing returns which in turn made the 
reserve backing stronger. This can be seen as a true possibility in the 
supplementary data as the Depreciation Fund raised dramatically, however 
it raised less than the increase in face value of securities held. The 
Commissioners could have realized that, as long as the increase in 
depreciation was less than investment in new securities, they would still 
remain above orthodox levels of reserves backing the currency notes in 
circulation.  
Figure 2. Test 2: Reserve Ratio by Asset Type (as percent of total assets) 
Source: Jamaican Gazette Colonial Annual Reports, Calculations. 
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Figure 3. Test 2: Reserve Ratio by Asset Type (as percent of total assets) 
Source: Jamaican Gazette Colonial Annual Reports, Calculations 
 
4.3. Test 3: Reserve pass-through ratio 
For a currency board to be orthodox, the reserve pass-through ratio 
should typically fall between 80-120 percent. (Reserve pass-through is the 
ratio of the change in the currency board’s monetary liabilities to the 
change in its reserves.) In the case of the Jamaican Currency board, this 
seems to be the case for the most part. There are, however, instances where 
the ratio deviates from the orthodox constraints. The first significant 
instance is a jump near 300 percent in 1934. This jump, which exceeds the 
acceptable orthodoxy constraint, means that though the net foreign assets 
and the monetary base moved in the same direction, the monetary base 
increased much more. This point on the graph must be disregarded 
because the numbers are somewhat misleading. In the actual data, this year 
had one of the smallest changes: the change in the monetary base was 
around 6 percent and change in net foreign assets was closer to 2 percent. 
Therefore, this was not that significant. The same thing occurred in 1947 as 
well and was corrected in 1948 just like the data in 1937 was corrected in 
1935. These corrections simply fell below 100 percent, meaning that the 
change in net foreign assets was growing faster than the change in the 
monetary base. In some currency boards, the reserve pass-through can fall 
below 0 percent indicating that the change in net foreign assets is moving 
in the opposite direction of the change in the monetary supply which show 
an unorthodox currency board. This never occurred in Jamaica. The dotted 
line in Figure 4 shows a linear trend line that indicates the moving average 
of the reserve pass-through ratio. This line shows the true orthodoxy of the 
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currency board as it stays within the constraints for the majority of the time 
and average out near the 100 percent goal of orthodoxy.  
Figure 4. Test 3: Reserve Pass-Through Ratio (percent) 
Source: Jamaican Gazette Colonial Annual Reports, Calculations 
 
4.4. Test 4: Domestic Assets 
Domestic assets should be 0 percent of total assets or close to it in order 
for a currency board to be orthodox. Jamaica enjoyed a fluctuation in 
thepercentage of domestic assets the currency board held. From 1921 
through 1923, domestic assets were 0 percent of total assets. However, after 
that, domestic assets ranged from between 0.82 percent and 28.69 percent 
of total assets. This indicates a deviation in orthodoxy when looking at this 
test, but the other tests (namely the foreign assets and the reserve pass-
through) indicate the currency board was orthodox at times. Even though 
there was a fluctuation in the amount of domestic assets held, many 
currency boards hold domestic assets to pay salaries and expenses. 
Furthermore, for most of the period from 1921 to 1959, the Jamaican 
currency board held many domestic assets in the form of silver coins. At 
this time, the exchange rate between the Jamaican pound and sterling was 
rigid, so at some point, local prices rose above foreign prices. As a result, 
people would exchange the Jamaican pound for foreign currency or buy 
cheaper goods from abroad. Then, the monetary authority would be likely 
to either devalue the Jamaican pound or shrink the monetary base.  
This was in fact the case. Based on the reserve pass-through test, the 
change in the net foreign assets should match that of the monetary base. 
Deviations of 20 percent or below were considered orthodox when this test 
was performed. In looking at the reserve pass-through graph, it can be 
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noted that the monetary base contracted at numerous times in twentieth 
century Jamaica. The most notable examples are between 1932 and 1937 as 
well as 1947 and 1950. During these years, the change in net foreign assets 
was negative as well. 
Figure 5. Test 4: Domestic Assets Held (percent) 
Source: Jamaica Gazette, Colonial Annual Reports, Calculations 
 
5. Timeline of central banking developments in 
Jamaica 
1950s: The Jamaican government starts to focus on the financial 
structure of the island and operations of institutions. The committee is 
established. 
1957: Inter-Departmental Committee on the Establishment of a National 
Development Bank in Jamaica is constituted. 
1959: Steps are taken to draft legislation for the establishment of the 
Bank of Jamaica. 
1960: The Bank of Jamaica is established as the Jamaican central bank. 
1961 and 1962: Inflow of short-term money from abroad causes an 
increase in bank liquidity. 
1966: The automatic link with the pound sterling is removed and the 
power for the central bank to declare an independent par value for the 
Jamaican pound is established. 
1972: The Jamaican dollar (which was floating with the sterling) is 
devalued on January 17, 1972 by 6.5% against all other currencies to correct 
the imbalance of the external sector. 
1973: The system collapses with the floating of exchange rates. Monetary 
measures are introduced to ease pressure on the balance of payments. 
1974: Further controls are implemented to stem the outflow of capital. 
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1976: The Bank of Jamaica Law is amended to allow the bank to provide 
credit to the central government to the extent of 30 percent of government 
revenue in a financial year. 
1977: The external reserves of Bank of Jamaica fall by US$3.4 million. 
1978: The government devalues the current exchange rate tostrengthen 
the balance of payments. 
1981: Jamaica starts a new three year Extended Fund Facility (E.F.F.) 
agreement with the IMF. 
1983: The balance of payments falls and an improvement of US$528 
million is targeted. The parallel market is instituted, attempting to stabilize 
the Jamaican dollar. 
1984: The Jamaican dollar is allowed to trade freely based on supply and 
demand. 
1990: Bank of Jamaica sets inflation targets.  
 
6. Central banking comes to Jamaica 
As Jamaica moved toward independence, more economists and 
politicians called for greater local discretionary control in monetary policy. 
They saw central banks as a way of mobilizing funds for governments to 
use productively (Hanke & Schuler 1995: 22). A local central bank would 
supposedly promote faster growth because it could make its policy in the 
best interest of Jamaica alone, rather than being constrained by monetary 
policy determined in London. The Jamaican government began seeking 
outside advice on what to do about the future of the Currency Board. 
Although a report by the World Bank in 1952 saw no need for changing the 
currency board system, Jamaica seemed determined to establish a central 
bank (World Bank 1952: 279). It did so despite further cautionary advice. 
Advisors to both the Bank of England and Bank of Canada sent notes to the 
Jamaican Minister of Finance discussing negative implications associated 
with a Jamaican central bank. The advisor to the Bank of Canada, Graham 
F. Towers, actually provided extensive plans for Jamaica to continue their 
currency board. These plans would allow for economic growth and 
progress, however would eliminate the need for a central bank. This plan, 
outlined by Towers, was fueled by government expenditure (Towers, 1956: 
18-19). After more reports and additional discussionduring 1958-1959, 
Jamaica established a committee to review all alternatives and conclude 
what would be done. That Jamaican committee recommended a central 
bank for Jamaica. The goal was to help eliminate the deficiencies that the 
currency board caused leading to supposedly subpar economic growth 
(Jamaica, Inter-Departmental Committee, 1958: 1; Hanke, 1995: 22). The 
committee proposed a central bank in 1959 and the government began 
regulations shortly after leading to the establishment of their central bank.  
Passing the Law of 1954 that permitted Jamaican government securities 
to be held was the first step away from the currency board system towards 
a central bank for the island. In 1959, the initial laws and regulations were 
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drawn up for the establishment of a Jamaican central bank. The laws 
passed in 1960 as the Bank of Jamaica Law (Laws 31 and 32 of 1960). The 
Bank of Jamaica opened on 1 May 1961. This date marked the official end of 
the currency board in Jamaica and the beginning of the centralbanking 
period, which continues today. In slightly more than a century Jamaica 
moved from a kind of dollarization to freebanking, then to an orthodox 
currency board, then to an unorthodox currency board as a clearly 
transitional phase, and finally to acentral bank. The transitions between 
monetary arrangements were smooth, as was the case in most other British 
Caribbean colonies but often not in the independent countries of the region. 
The currency board successfully maintained a fixed exchange rate for 
Jamaican notes into sterling. It deviated from orthodoxy towards the end of 
its life, but in a clearly planned manner intended to provide a kind of 
transition to central banking. 
Through The Bank of Jamaica, the Jamaican government continued to 
maintain the parity of the Jamaican pound with the UK pound even though 
the legal backing was reduced from 110  percent to 50  percent sterling. The 
Jamaican pound was freely convertible into sterling (though still not into 
third currencies such as the U.S. dollar), meaning that the interest rate set 
by the Bank of Jamaica could not decrease too far below the UK rate 
without causing capital flight. 
During the central banking period of the late 1960s, the central bank 
devalued the Jamaican sterling, and then the Jamaican pound. The 
exchange rate fell from US$2.80 per Jamaican pound in 1961 to US$2.40 by 
the end of the decade. This was accompanied by a sharp increase in the 
current account deficit, from J£3 million in 1961 to J£45.1 million in 1969.  
 
7. Monetary policy under central banking 
The price of oil, a major import, increased by a factor of four from 1973 
to 1974, hurting the economy. The government borrowed from the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) for the first time. Now, the government 
raided the Bank of Jamaica’s foreign-currency reserves, creating inflation. 
The bank’s net foreign-currency reserves fell from J$113 million in 1970 to -
J$545 million in 1980. The government was allowed to borrow up to 30 
percent of estimated yearly revenue from the bank, up from an earlier limit 
of 15 percent. In fact, the amount of currency in circulation went up from 
J$18 million to J$32 millionfrom 1962 to 1968 and from J$37 million to J$102 
million in 1974 (during the central banking period, the Jamaican pound was 
set to two dollars, representing an accounting change).  
In the 1980s, the government set interest rate ceilings for savers and the 
currency was heavily managed. The economy shrank and inflation 
increased along with government budget deficits. In January 1983, the Bank 
of Jamaica eased foreign-exchange control by instating a dual exchange rate 
until May 1978. The M1 money supply increased from J$717 million In 1980 
to J$4,016 million in 1990. M2 increased from J$1,712 million to J$12,891. 
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In the Bank of Jamaica in the 1990s was fairly successful. In 1990 and 
1991, it loosened foreign-exchange controls and the Jamaican dollar was 
largely convertible for the first time since 1970. Jamaican started to 
experience an inflow of foreign currency for the first time. Inflation 
increased from8.4 percent in 1987 to 80.2 percent in 1991 due to large 
government budget deficits. The M1 money supply increased from 4,016 
million dollars to in 1990 to 45,042 million dollars in 1999. M2 increased 
from 12,891 million dollars to 131,096 million dollars. The Bank of Jamaica 
adopted inflation targeting in the 1990, with an initial target of 12 percent. 
Currently (2019), the target is a band of 4-6 percent. 
 
8. Comparing the currency board and central banking 
periods 
Now let us compare some aspects of Jamaica’s monetary and economic 
performance in the currency board era and the central banking era. 
The first factor to analyze is real GDP per capita using millions of 2011 
U.S. dollars. GDP per capita grew by an annualized growth rate of 8.0 
percent from 1953 to 1963 (towards the end of the currency board period), 
but slowed in growth when central banking was implemented. In the 
period from 1963 to 1973, real GDP per capita grew at an annualized rate of 
2.9 percent. Real GDP per capita growth slowed during more recent years, 
as can be seen in the graph below. Real GDP measured in millions of 2011 
US dollars saw promising growth towards the end of the currency board 
period, but decreased throughout the central banking period and 
rebounded. Therefore, through analyzing real GDP, Jamaica’s economy 
seems to have performed better while operating under a currency board. 
 
Source: Maddison Project, B.R. Mitchell: International Historical Statistics 
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In the graph above, Jamaica’s real GDP per capita is compared to 
Barbados, which like Jamaica is a Caribbean island that was a longtime 
British colony until achieving independence in the 1960s. Barbados had 
similar outputper capita to Jamaica in 1950, during Jamaica’s currency 
board period. During the mid-1970s and 1980s, Barbados’ real GDP per 
capitagrewfaster than Jamaica’s. However, when observing real GDP with 
millions of 2011 US dollars, Barbados had a significantly smaller output 
when compared to Jamaica both in 1950 and 2016. However, real GDP per 
capita is a better measure of quality of life. 
The next criterion to analyze is inflation during the currency board 
period compared to inflation in the central banking era. The highest 
inflation rate from 1941 through 1961 was 20.2 percent in 1948, with an 
average rate of 5.9 percent. Meanwhile, during the central banking period 
(from 1962 through 2000), the average inflation rates was 16.3 percent. The 
highest inflation rate was 50.9 percent in 1991. Once again, we see that 
although inflation was not particularly steady during the currency board 
period, it was comparatively more stable when looking at the central 
banking period. Below, in the graph, it can be seen that there was a stark 
difference between the average inflation rates during the currency board 
period and central banking era. However, inflation in Jamaica was under 
control in the late 1990s and in recent years, has been stable. Despite a flare-
up in the mid-2000s, the central bank has been fairly effective. 
Source: Maddison Project, B.R. Mitchell: International Historical Statistics 
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Source: B.R. Mitchell: International Historical Statistics 
 
The term “financial deepening” is used to describe increasing provision 
of financial services to people in an economy. Those who are unbanked or 
underbanked in a society are provided with increasing access to ways to 
finance themselves. Typically, financial deepening can increase the ratio of 
money supply to nominal GDP, allowing for liquidity increases and for 
people to have access to investment. Like many developing economies, 
Jamaica saw increases in financial deepening in both the currency board 
period and central banking era. From 1953 to 1961, the end of the currency 
board era, M2 as a percentage of nominal GDP was relatively stagnant at 
around 20 percent. However, with the implementation of central banking, 
M2 as a percentage of nominal GDP grew increasingly rapidly in the 1980s, 
but slowed down soon after. Today, M2 is around 50% of nominal GDP. 
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Source: B.R. Mitchell: International Historical Statistics,  IMF International Financial Statistics 
 
Another measure we can analyze is net foreign assets of the financial 
system (not just the currency board or central bank) as a percentage of the 
broader money supply. Here, M2 (currency in circulation plus demand and 
time deposits at banks) was used. As can be seen in the graph below, net 
foreign assets as a percentage of M2 was positive from 1953 up until 1975, 
starting at roughly 50 percent in 1953. This includes the last eight years of 
the currency board era as well as into the central banking period. Then, the 
ratio became negative, indicating that there were fewer foreign assets than 
foreign liabilities, meaning that Jamaica shifted from a net lender to a net 
borrower.  
 
 
Source: B.R. Mitchell:  International Historical Statistics and IMF International Financial Statistics 
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A country’s current account balance is made up of the balance of trade, 
net primary income, and net cash transfers. A current account surplus 
means that exports exceed imports, while a deficit means that exports were 
less than imports. Towards the end of Jamaica’s currency board period, in 
the early 1960s, Jamaica had a stable current account balance, slightly 
negative. However, as central banking era progressed, Jamaica had an 
increasingly negative current account balance (see figure below) for a long 
period. In numerous years in the 2000s, the current account balance was 
almost as much as US$3 billion in deficit. Typically, during strong 
economic expansions, imports surge, so the current account deficit widens. 
The currency exchange rate also affects the trade balance, and thus the 
current account. An overvalued currency makes imports cheaper and 
exports more expensive, widening the current account deficit. In Jamaica’s 
case, the current account deficit increased not due to economic expansion 
(as real GDP per capita was actually shrinking in the mid-2000s), but 
because of an overvalued currency.  
 
 
Source: IMF International Statistics, B.R. Mitchell: International Historical Statistics 
 
Another aspect in which it is worthwhile to compare the performance of 
the currency board and central banking periods is exchange rates. The 
Jamaican dollar depreciated substantially against the U.S. dollar since the 
end of the currency board period. Jamaica’s currency used the pound 
sterling as the anchor until 1973, when it switched to the U.S. dollar. The 
U.S. dollar has since been either the official anchor or the unofficial gauge 
for judging currency depreciation. As can be seen in the graph below. In 
1957, 0.7 Jamaican dollars were worth one U.S. dollar, but in 1978, the 
Jamaican dollar depreciated to being worth less than a U.S. dollar. As of 
2018 the exchange rate was nearly 127 Jamaican dollars per U.S. dollar. 
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Depreciation of the Jamaican dollar was related to increased central bank 
financing of the government. A similar trend can be observed from the 
graph depicting the exchange rate between the Jamaican dollar and the 
pound sterling. During the currency board period, the Jamaican pound was 
equal to the pound sterling. When the Jamaican dollar replaced the 
Jamaican pound at 2 dollars per pound, the exchange rate changed to 2 
Jamaican dollars per pound sterling. This was purely an accounting 
change, a redenomination rather than a devaluation. However, the 
Jamaican dollar clearly depreciated massively compared to the pound 
sterling as the central banking era progressed, specifically in the 1980s. 
 
 
Source: IMF International Financial Statistics Calculations 
 
The main reason for the rapid inflation in the Jamaican dollar was the 
increase in the Jamaican government budget balance as a fraction of 
nominal GDP (both were measured in Jamaican dollars). During the last 
decade of the currency board period, the government budget balancewas 
either zero, or close to it. As a result, the government budget balance as a 
percentage of nominal GDP was stable. However, as the central banking 
period continued, this number became increasingly negative. In the 1980s, 
the Jamaican government budget balance as afraction of nominal GDP 
grew unstable. The government used many accounting tricks, making these 
budgetary increases difficult to track (Hanke 1995: 24). These spikes in 
government spending allowed for inflation andforeign debt to grow 
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during the currency board period, but increased in the 1970s and 1980s, as 
central banking came to Jamaica. This goes with the pattern that the 
government borrowed increasing amounts of money, causing inflation to 
rise as well. 
 
Source: B.R. Mitchell: International Historical Statistics 
 
It should be noted that there exist significant differences between the 
annual balance sheet data for Jamaica and the monthly/semi-annual data in 
the Jamaica Gazette. The most important difference is that the Gazette omits 
the Depreciation Fund, which is included on the annual balance sheet. 
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Because the Gazette data are only partial, although we have transcribed 
them, where possible we rely on the annual data in the analysis that 
follows. 
 
9. Conclusion 
Jamaica struggled through several attempts at a unified monetary 
regime prior to the arrival of the Commissioners of Currency in 1904. In the 
country’s early colonial history, Jamaicans used Spanish and Portuguese 
coins due to the absence of an established Jamaican currency. However, 
after the emancipation of slaves there was an excess demand for currency. 
To counteract the loss of notes in circulation for the economy, the Jamaican 
government began allowing the emerging commercial banks to issue their 
own notes. The Jamaican currency remained strong due to a fixed exchange 
rate to the pound sterling amidst a system where multiple currency brands 
were accepted. In the early 1900’s the Jamaican government, led by the 
island Treasurer, began to consider the possibility of establishing a 
currency board. After many years of preparation, the currency board 
period began. On 22 September 1904, Jamaica published the Currency 
Notes Law, establishing a currency board to issue 10-shilling notes. 
Although, the Commissioners of Currency remained inactive during this 
period. On 9 January 1920, the Currency Amendment Law was passed this 
allowing the Commissioners of Currency to accept and pay out British 
Treasury £1 and 10-shilling notes for the first time as if they were British 
coins. From 1939 until the end of the currency board period, the Jamaican 
pound remained fully convertible into the pound sterling but was not fully 
convertible into many third currencies. The Currency Notes Law of 1958 
stopped Barclays Bank from issuing notes. This officially left the board the 
sole issuer of local currency in Jamaica. In the absence of entities issuing 
competing currencies on the island, the Commissioners of Currency began 
to act similar to a central bank for the first time. The Jamaica 
Commissioners of Currency officially existed from 15 March 1920 to 30 
April 1961. After which, it was succeeded by the Bank of Jamaica, the 
central bank that continues in existence today. It was due to the laws 
passed in 1960 as the Bank of Jamaica Law creating the Bank of Jamaica, 
which opened on 1 May 1961. This date marked the official end of the 
currency board in Jamaica and the beginning of the central banking period, 
which continues today.  
Altogether, the Commissioners never deviated (more than 0.6 percent) 
from orthodoxy up to the point that note issue by commercial banks ceased 
and they became the sole issuers of currency for the island. This is when 
they started acting like a central bank and they amended the laws making 
the reserve requirements less harsh. The currency board acted as a perfect 
transition from a system in which multiple currencies were accepted into a 
central bank regime. It took many years but can be seen as a very effective 
way to implement a dramatic change. Jamaica’s currency board can 
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certainly be referred to as one of the most successful regimes of any 
Caribbean Colony of that time.  
During the analysis comparing the various aspects of the Jamaican 
economy between the currency board and central banking periods, it was 
seen that the economy fared better during the currency board era. Jamaica 
saw a lower average inflation rate during the currency board period, more 
consistent financial deepening, a smaller current account deficit, and better 
real GDP per capita growth. However, in recent years, Jamaica’s economy 
has performed better as the central bank has chosen to target a certain 
inflation rate. 
Note only published data and statistics were examined, as a lot of data is 
unavailable for use. Some data, such as years, may have been missing and 
were not included in this paper. Utilizing that yearly data, if available 
elsewhere, might provide a more accurate detailing of the Jamaican 
currency board. The most important aspect of this paper was to test overall 
orthodoxy and provide a background of the history. Our data should be 
useful to any later researchers, as well as the history to the monetary 
regimes. 
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